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Abstract
The evolution of cooperation is difficult to understand, because cheaters — individuals who profit
without cooperating themselves — have a benefit in interaction with cooperators. Cooperation
among humans is even more difficult to understand, because cooperation occurs in large groups,
making cheating a bigger threat. Restricting cooperation to members of one’s own group based on
some tag-based recognition of non-group members (allorecognition) has been shown to stabilise
cooperation. We address how spatial structure and group size affect the opportunities for cheating
such tag-based cooperation in a spatially explicit simulation. We show that increased group diver-
sity, under conditions of limited dispersal, reduces the selective opportunities for cheaters. A small
number can already be sufficient to keep cheating at a low frequency. We discuss how marginal
additional benefits of increased group size, above the benefits of local cooperation, can provide the
selective pressure to reduce the number of group identities and discuss possible examples.
Keywords
altruism, cooperation, allorecognition, cultural inheritance, human evolution, levels of selec-
tion, kin selection, reciprocal altruism.
1. Introduction
Humans in all cultures have a tendency to cooperate, although not unlimited,
but typically with a subset of the population only. For example, in hunter-
gatherer societies, game is shared between individuals, also with individuals
that do not hunt themselves (Lewis et al., 2014). Communities tend to take
care for sick, wounded, very young and very old people. Also warfare is char-
acterised by cooperation among individuals who risk their lives to help the
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group to which they belong, in the war against another group. The evolution
of such cooperative behaviour, i.e., behaviour that benefits other individuals,
is hard to understand. In a group of cooperators, ‘cheaters’, who do not co-
operate, but receive the cooperation by other individuals, will experience a
relative benefit. Cooperation in human societies is even harder to explain, as
it occurs in large groups.
Two main explanations have been proposed for the evolution of coopera-
tion: kin selection or inclusive fitness effects and reciprocal altruism (Hamil-
ton, 1964a, b; Trivers, 1971; Axelrod & Dion, 1988). Inclusive fitness effects
occur through interactions between genetically related individuals. Natural
selection not only occurs through the effect of a gene on its bearer’s fitness,
but also through its effect on other individuals carrying copies of that gene.
This can imply that a gene promoting a cooperative behaviour can be se-
lected via its positive effect on social partners, even if this behaviour has a
negative effect on its carrier’s fitness. In most social organisms, cooperation
occurs among genetically related individuals, and kin selection theory is the
most widely accepted one to explain the evolution of cooperation.
The second main category of explanation for the evolution of coopera-
tion, is for cooperation between unrelated social partners through reciprocal
altruism. Reciprocal altruism can evolve, if received help enhances the re-
cipient’s cooperativeness (Trivers, 1971). Reciprocity can generate stable
cooperation if costly help sufficiently increases the likelihood that donors
obtain fitness benefits in return for helping, provided that the benefits more
than compensate for the costs of initial investment (strictly speaking, recip-
rocal altruism, therefore, is not true altruism as pointed out by West et al.,
2007). This means that the benefit from being helped must on average ex-
ceed the cost of helping, and that social interactions should be sufficiently
frequent.
A crucial requirement shared by both types of explanations is that co-
operative individuals interact with cooperative individuals more than with
uncooperative individuals (Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009). Such positive assort-
ment can be achieved via recognition of relatives (kin recognition), previous
interactions with individuals (for generalized reciprocity (Taborsky, 2013);
for direct reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981); or, for indirect reciprocity
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998)) or little migration resulting in high population
viscosity (Hamilton, 1964b; but see Queller, 1994; West et al., 2002), alone
or in combination. Various theoretical studies have addressed the evolution
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of cooperation via positive assortment based on discernible phenotypic tags,
either genetically or culturally inherited (Axelrod et al., 2004; Hammond &
Axelrod, 2006; Cohen, 2012; Czaran, 2014).
However, theoretical problems have been identified for the evolution of
cooperation based on these two types of tags, genetically and culturally in-
herited. First, if tags are genetically encoded, short-term selection will work
against the genetic diversity of tags. The common allele will always be
favoured, because it will receive more cooperation than rare alleles. There-
fore, tag-based cooperation ‘eats up’ the genetic variation upon which it
crucially relies, a prediction now known as ‘Crozier’s paradox’ (Crozier,
1986; Rousset & Roze, 2007; Aanen et al., 2008; Bastiaans et al., 2015).
Recent simulations show that cheating can stabilise genetic kin recognition
(Axelrod et al., 2004; Czaran, 2014). A problem for culturally inherited tags
is that they may be vulnerable to imitation and thus not reliable to base
cooperation on. However, some culturally inherited markers, such as lan-
guage and accent are hard to fake and hard to hide, and may thus be more
reliable tags (Sigmund & Nowak, 2001; Cohen, 2012). Another possible ex-
ample of a hard-to-fake culturally inherited tag is religious membership. In
many cases, being or becoming a member encompasses costly behaviours
and rituals, which are not easy to fake for non-believers. These ‘tags’ may,
thus, reliably signal the presence of cooperative intention toward in-group
members, buffering religious groups against defection from freeloaders and
reinforcing cooperative norms (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008).
These different means to restrict interactions to a subset of the population
put a limit to the size of cooperating groups. Several studies have demon-
strated that this is indeed the case (kin selection: Czaran, 2014; reciprocal
altruism: Boyd & Richerson, 1988). Because of the limited group size, it is
generally assumed that many forms of cooperation in humans cannot be ex-
plained by current models of kin selection and reciprocity as cooperation
occurs in groups that extend the theoretically expected size by orders of
magnitude. However, it remains hard to judge this inference as group size
is rarely modelled separately, but only implicitly as a consequence of the
joint evolution of tag diversity and cooperation. In this manuscript, we first
explore the evolution of tag-based cooperation in a spatially structured en-
vironment. Next, we vary group size by varying the maximum number of
groups, and establish the importance of group size for the opportunities of
cheating.
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2. Material and methods
2.1. The model
The model is a spatially explicit cellular automaton (CA) addressing the
problem of evolving group discrimination as a means to avoid cheaters in-
vade and eventually replace populations of cooperators.
The basic assumptions of the model are the following:
1. Spatial setup: A population of individuals (or that of highly coherent
assemblies of individuals, like families) occupy an area represented by a
1000 × 1000 square lattice of residential units (‘homes’). We attribute a
toroidal topology to the area by assuming that the homes on the opposite
edges of the lattice are neighbours, so that each home is equivalent to
all the others, in terms of the number and the spatial configuration of
neighbours (i.e., no edge effect confounds the dynamics). All homes are
always inhabited, each by one individual (family).
2. Clan identity: The individuals (families) are assigned group (‘clan’)
identities based on kinship; clans are defined by genetic relatedness
which, in turn, determines the willingness of their members to cooper-
ate — no cooperation between members of different clans occurs. Clan
identities are directly inherited: the offspring belong to the clan of the
parent, except for rare ‘mutation’ events whereby the progeny takes a
random clan identity with probability μg.
3. Cooperating teams: Cooperation takes place in local teams composed of
a focal individual (family) and its immediate neighbours belonging to
its own clan, and it aims at harvesting some benefit — the cooperation
payoff — that increases the fitness of the team as a whole. Cooperators
also pay a fitness cost of cooperation individually. Observe that three
nested levels of group identities are kept track of in the model: clans and
teams are separate levels of interaction (besides the trivial population
level): teams are cooperating units of individuals (families) within the
clans, whereas clans are recognition units within the population.
4. Cooperators and cheaters: Cooperation is feasible only with clan-mates
present in a team. Individuals can always discriminate members of other
clans; therefore, teams of size 1 never attempt cooperation. Cooperators
may mutate to cheaters (who do not cooperate even with their own clan-
mates, thus they do not pay the cost but enjoy the benefit of cooperation)
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with probability μc; cooperation and cheating are also heritable traits.
Cooperators cannot discriminate cheaters, so they attempt cooperation
(and pay its cost) even if all other clan-mates are cheaters in the team,
but cooperation increases team fitness only above n = 1.
5. Team fitness benefit of cooperation: The maximum size of a potentially
cooperating team is 5 individuals (families), but, depending on the clan
identities of the neighbours, it may be anything between 1 and 5 (0 is not
feasible, since all homes, thus also the focal one, are inhabited). The per
capita contribution w(n) of cooperators to team fitness WT follows a ‘di-
minishing returns’ pattern with increasing the number n of cooperators
in the team:
w(n) = w0 ×
(
1 + f × n − 1
n
)
(n = 1 − 5),
w(0) = w0,
where f determines the strength of the cooperative effect, and w0 is the
baseline fitness contribution of a solitary individual (family). Cheaters
contribute w0 each, so that the team fitness WT(n,m) of a team consist-
ing of n cooperators and m cheaters becomes
WT(n,m) = mw0 + nw(n)
= mw0 + nw0 ×
(
1 + f × n − 1
n
)
= (n + m)w0 + fw0(n − 1) for n = 1 − 5
and
WT(0,m) = mw0,
which means that the team-fitness benefit of cooperation fw0(n − 1) is
a linear function of the number of cooperators.
6. Allocation of team benefits and cooperation costs to team members: The
team fitness WT is shared equally among the members of a team, irre-
spective of their actual contribution. Cooperators also pay an individual
fitness cost of cooperation, c, which cheaters do not, therefore the actual
fitness share of a cooperator is WT(n,m)
n+m − c, whereas that of a cheater is
WT(n,m)
n+m for (n + m) > 1, and it is always the baseline fitness w0 for a
solitary individual (family), i.e., for (n + m) = 1, irrespective of it being
a cooperator or a cheater.
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7. Local and global dispersion: Individuals (families) produce offspring
in proportions of their individual fitness (which consists of their share
of the team fitness in each generation, and possibly the fitness cost of
cooperation in the case of cooperating individuals). The vast majority
of the offspring remains close to their parents (i.e., within a distance D
from them), but a small fraction g of the offspring disperses far away,
attempting to occupy randomly chosen homes within the lattice.
8. Population dynamics: Each home is assigned to a single individual (fam-
ily) in each generation, even if more offspring from the last generation
claims for it. The candidates compete for the homes with chances of
winning proportional to their fitness. Obviously, the offspring of a parent
(family) have the best chances to occupy homes within the local dis-
persal distance D of their parents; the remote colonisation probability
depends on the rate of global dispersal g. Thus the outcome of competi-
tion for a home depends on the fitness of the individuals claiming it, and
the distances of the targeted home from those of their parents. The local
outcomes add up to constitute the next generation.
3. Results
Our simulations demonstrate that group (clan) identity, i.e., the ability to dis-
tinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’ can reduce the frequency of cheaters. However,
the stabilisation of cooperation via clan identity works only under conditions
of limited dispersal, combined with a low rate of global dispersal (see be-
low). Starting from a single clan of cooperating individuals and allowing for
heritable changes (‘mutations’) in cooperation strategy (from ‘cooperator’ to
‘cheater’ or vice versa within the same clan) and in clan identity (from coop-
erator to cooperator or cheater to cheater of a different clan) we have run the
simulations for 10 000 generations, systematically exploring the influence of
different model parameters modifying one parameter at a time, relative to a
basic set of feasible parameter values producing the dynamics and the lattice
pattern shown on Figure 1. Figure 2 is a summary of all simulated parameter
settings.
3.1. Role of the number of clan identities
The most important question we wish to answer is whether the system is
capable of maintaining cooperation in spite of the substantial fitness ad-
vantage that cheaters are supposed to enjoy in a predominantly cooperating
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population. As expected, a single clan of cooperators (N = 1) cannot resist
the selection pressure of its own cheaters if cooperation is costly and clan
identity cannot be changed: the equilibrium proportion of cooperators in the
stationary population of a single clan is negligibly small. Increasing the num-
ber of possible clan identities (N ) allows for the coexistence of cheaters and
cooperators — the higher N is, the less the proportion of cheaters in the sta-
tionary population (Figure 3A). The mechanism ensuring coexistence is the
fugitive behaviour of cooperators: In a resident population of cheaters be-
longing to clan A the cooperators of another clan B are at an advantage: they
can cooperate among themselves and harvest the benefits thereof, but the
cheaters of clan A cannot exploit their cooperation. As soon as the cheaters
of clan B show up in teams of B cooperators (due to mutation or global
dispersion) cheaters invade the spatially contiguous patch of the cooperator
population. If most clan B cooperators belong to a single patch, the takeover
by the cheaters eradicates almost all cooperators of the clan from the pop-
ulation, but if the clan is spatially fragmented into more patches, then the
cooperators in other patches remain safe until hit by another cheating mutant.
The recruitment of new clans proceeds until the invasion of cheaters into the
cooperator patches of the same clan becomes as fast as the invasion of coop-
erators into cheater patches of other clans, i.e., until cooperator and cheater
fitnesses become equal. As the number of different clans increases average
patch size decreases. Smaller cooperator patches persist longer, because they
are hit less often by mutant or migrant cheaters of the same clan. At the same
time, increasing N allows for the spatial isolation of different patches of a
clan: the four-colour map theorem (Appel & Haken, 1977) ensures that each
clan can be fragmented so that every patch of a certain clan is surrounded
by patches of other clans, if N  4. As soon as the fragmentation effect sets
in, the proportion p of cheaters falls dramatically within the population, and
increasing N further does not have a substantial effect on the stationary pro-
portion p (cf., Figure 3A). This explains the phase transition-like fall of p
with increasing N at about N = 5.
3.2. Role of the fitness cost of cooperation
Allowing for many clan identities (at fixed N = 50) and changing the actual
fitness cost of cooperation c from low to high values has a consistent effect
(Figure 4): (1) At low cooperation cost (c = 0.1) cheaters cannot invade the
cooperating community, and new ‘mutant’ clans do not increase to signifi-
cant sizes either. The selective force keeping new clans at check is that the
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average team size, and thus the average fitness of the resident, cooperating
clan is larger than that of a new mutant clan. (2) At intermediate cooperation
costs (0.2 < c < f/2 = 0.5 for f = 1) cheaters can invade the cooperating
population, which responds to the invasion of cheaters by evolving new clans
of cooperators. The number of clans increases until the average fitness of
cooperators and cheaters becomes equal, and the population settles at a sta-
tionary cooperator/cheater ratio. Increasing cooperation costs also increases
the equilibrium number of clans maintained, because high cost means fast
takeover of cooperators’ patches by cheaters, from which the only escape for
cooperators is to change clan identity and start a new cooperators’ patch be-
fore cheaters eradicate them. Essentially, cooperators defend themselves by
changing clan identity, but at high cooperation costs the takeover of cheaters
is much faster than the formation of new cooperating patches. (3) Obviously,
at fitness costs of cooperation higher than the fitness benefit thereof (i.e., for
c > f/2 = 0.5) cheaters take over, but the number of clans remains high due
to the high number of quickly failing initiations of new cooperating clans.
The overall effect is a lot of very fragmented clans with a marginal fraction
(about 0.5–1.0%) of cooperators in each. Note that solitary cooperators are
selectively neutral against the cheaters of other clans, because they do not
even attempt to cooperate alone, therefore they do not pay the (high) coop-
eration cost, but they are immediately selected against when they occur in
the same team and start to cooperate with each other. Once a clan consists
of cheaters and solitary cooperators, the group size levelling effect of ‘mu-
tations’ sets in: since larger clans produce more individuals of other clans
Figure 1. Simulations with the basic parameter setting as specified: f , cooperation fitness
advantage parameter; c, cooperation fitness cost; μ = μg = μs , mutation rates; D, local dis-
persal distance; g, proportion of globally dispersed offspring; N , maximum number of clans.
(A) The dynamics of clan and strategy distributions. Grey bands indicate proportion of co-
operators, black bands above grey ones the proportion of cheaters of the same clan as the
cooperators below. (B) The spatial pattern of cooperation and cheating in the 10 000th gen-
eration. Shades of green indiacte cooperators of different clans, shades of red cheaters of
different clans. (C) The average number of clans (Avg_Groups) and the average cumulated
proportion of cheaters (Avg_Cheats) of the last 1000 generations in 10 replicate runs of the
simulation program, replicates differing only in random number seeds. Vertical and hori-
zontal bars indicate the ranges of change in the corresponding variable during the last 1000
generations. This figure is published in colour in the online edition of this journal, which can
be accessed via http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/1568539x.
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Figure 2. Parameter settings of the simulations performed. Oval boxes, the basic parameter
set; rectangular boxes, alternative values of the parameter in the corresponding oval box.
Parameters have been changed one at a time, except for the two mutation rates which have
been changed both simultaneously and separately.
than small ones, clan sizes tend to become equal. This is what maintains clan
diversity at high cooperation cost.
3.3. Role of mutation rate
New clans and cheaters are, in the first place, supplied by ‘mutation’, i.e.,
by some individuals changing their inherited clan identities or cooperation
strategies. Therefore, the rate of mutation is an important determinant of the
actual dynamics of clan diversity and cooperation. Obviously, zero mutation
rates would allow no change, but very low mutation rates (μ = 10−5) are
sufficient to initiate the increase in clan number and to set the balance of
cooperation and cheating in the population, if the other parameters allow for
it. The simultaneous increase of both mutation rates (i.e., that of clan identity
and of cooperation strategy) has a substantial effect on clan diversity — the
equilibrium number of clans steeply increases with μ —, but the average
equilibrium frequency of cheaters admits just a marginal increase at the same
time, with decreasing fluctuations. Very low mutation rates (i.e., μ = 10−5)
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Figure 3. The role of the maximum number of clan identities for the average cumulated
proportion of cheaters (Avg_Cheats) during the last 1000 generations of the simulations.
Vertical and horizontal bars indicate the ranges of change in the corresponding variable during
the last 1000 generations.
induce high amplitude oscillations in cheater frequency, indicating that the
population dynamical time-scale of the system is much faster in this case
than the ‘evolutionary’ scale on which new strategies appear. If ‘mutations’
to cheating are rare, and the dynamics of the population is relatively fast, then
cheating individuals will take over (percolate) within large, coherent patches
of their own ‘susceptible’ (cooperating) clan, after which they will be locally
driven extinct by cooperators of different clans. This upswing-downswing
dynamics is of high amplitude, if mutations to cheating are rare, because
cooperating patches may grow large before being hit by a cheating mutant,
and the large cheater patches thus established fall deep after they have taken
over. This is an aspect of the role of the inherent randomness of evolutionary
processes in shaping cooperation patterns (Hadzibeganovic et al., 2015).
Independently varying the two mutation rates explains why simultane-
ous mutation rate increase has no consistent effect on cheater proportion:
more frequent mutations to cheating increase the proportion of cheaters,
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Figure 4. The role of the fitness cost of cooperation for the average cumulated proportion
of cheaters (Avg_Cheats) during the last 1000 generations of the simulations. Vertical and
horizontal bars indicate the ranges of change in the corresponding variable during the last
1000 generations.
whereas more frequent clan identity mutations help cooperators to escape
exploitation by cheaters of their own clans, which decreases overall cheater
frequency (Figure 5A, B); the two effects cancel each other when both mu-
tation rates increase simultaneously. Very high mutation rates (i.e., μ = 0.1)
induce phase transition-like shifts in the corresponding directions: extremely
frequent strategy switches (μs = 0.1) to cheating abruptly pushes the num-
ber of clans down to N = 1 and increases the proportion of cheaters to about
60%. On the other hand, μg = 0.1 abolishes cheaters almost completely,
keeping the number of clans at its possible maximum (N = 50).
3.4. Role of dispersal
Dispersal (i.e., the spatial distance between the homes of parents and off-
spring) is determined by two parameters in the model: D, the maximum
distance of locally dispersed offspring from the parent, and g, the propor-
tion of offspring dispersed globally within the lattice at random. The success
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Figure 5. The role of mutation rates for the average cumulated proportion of cheaters
(Avg_Cheats) during the last 1000 generations of the simulations. (A) The role of the muta-
tion rate to new clans; (B) the role of the rate of strategy mutations. Vertical and horizontal
bars indicate the ranges of change in the corresponding variable during the last 1000 genera-
tions.
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of an invading clan depends on its ability to place cooperating individuals
into cheater patches of other clans, and the ability of the propagule to colo-
nize that patch. Delegating propagules to suitable places partly depends on
global dispersal (besides clan identity mutations); therefore, increasing g is
advantageous for cooperation in this respect. However, large g is also ad-
vantageous for cheaters to spread and find exploitable cooperator patches of
their own clan. The net effect of increasing the proportion of globally dis-
persed offspring seems to be beneficial for cooperators at very low g values
(0 < g < 0.03), with the proportion of cheaters, as well as the number of
different clans decreasing, but increasing global dispersal further is delete-
rious: average cheater frequency as well as the amplitude of fluctuations in
clan size, clan number and cheater frequency all increase with g > 0.03 (Fig-
ure 6A), and all these effects tend to destabilize the population. The average
number of clans increases with global dispersal at the higher g region, again
due to the self-defence mechanism of cooperators trying to avoid extinction.
Local dispersal maintains the coherence of locally cooperating teams.
Therefore, keeping D small is obviously advantageous for cooperation, and
too large D values have an effect similar to large global dispersion: they
induce high amplitude fluctuations in clan size, clan number and cheater
frequency and increase the average incidence of cheating, while average clan
number does not consistently change with increasing D (Figure 6B).
Thus, the two dispersal mechanisms (local and global) seem to have sim-
ilar dynamical effects, essentially due to the level of population mixing in
space they imply. It is well known that cheaters can benefit from popula-
tion mixing (Nowak & Sigmund, 2004), although highly viscous population
structures prevent the emergence of cooperative strategies due to local com-
petition (cf., Queller, 1994; West et al., 2002), but it is slightly different in
this model than in classical cooperator-cheater games: since solitary cooper-
ators do not attempt to cooperate, they do not pay the cost of cooperation and
therefore they are not selected against in pure cheater teams of other clans.
This explains the relatively high tolerance level of cooperators to increased
mixing either at high g or at high D; the same argument applies at high rates
of mutation to cheating (at μs = 0.1, see above).
4. Discussion
The evolution of cooperation provides a problem for evolutionary biology
(Sachs et al., 2004; Lehmann & Keller, 2006; West et al., 2007). Why would
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Figure 6. The role of dispersal for the average cumulated proportion of cheaters
(Avg_Cheats) during the last 1000 generations of the simulations. (A) The role of global
dispersal (g); (B) the role of local dispersal (D). Vertical and horizontal bars indicate the
ranges of change in the corresponding variable during the last 1000 generations.
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an individual provide a costly benefit to another individual, if it can also save
this cost and profit form the help provided by others? The two main classes
of explanation, i.e., kin selection and reciprocity, both depend on limiting
interactions to a subset of the population, which has a higher probability to
employ the cooperative behaviour (Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009). This positive
assortment can be achieved in various ways, such as recognition of previ-
ous behaviour (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), limited dispersal resulting in a
viscous population structure (Hamilton, 1964b; but see Queller, 1994; West
et al., 2002), kin recognition (Hamilton, 1964b) or recognition of culturally
inherited tags (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006; Ihara, 2011; Cohen, 2012).
Our simulations consider the importance of group identity in a popu-
lation of varying viscosity for the evolutionary stability of cooperation in
small neighbourhoods. The model is abstract, focusing on local cooperation
based on broadcasted group (clan) identity but neglecting factors of coop-
eration obviously important in any actual human population, like past or
expected reciprocities, punishments or rewards, and even less aware of hier-
archically organized and institutionalized forms of cooperation characteristic
of modern human societies. By constraining cooperation to small, personally
connected and genetically related ‘teams’ of individuals (families) the sce-
nario of this model applies best to prehistoric, early human communities.
This narrative fits best to the primary motivation of this study: to explain the
selective forces driving the early evolution of group discrimination. We have
assumed that cooperation is a fixed strategy directed to clan-mates only, and
that clan identity is specified by a tag, in most likelihood culturally inherited
with a high fidelity. Accordingly, we ask questions regarding the possibil-
ities of maintaining cooperation through rigid group discrimination in the
simplest possible social setup devoid of subtle social control mechanisms.
Our results demonstrate that variation in group identity is an efficient
means to disfavour selection of cheating behaviour. At the same time, focus-
ing on the maintenance of tag diversity, the recurrent threat of cheating via
mutation favours tag diversity, and solves Crozier’s paradox (Crozier, 1986).
However, the efficiency of selection against cheating is conditional on lim-
ited dispersal. Similar group identity and limited dispersal both increase the
probability that cooperative individuals interact. In most human populations
and for most possible kinds of group identity, group identity and philopatry
are linked, so this seems a reasonable assumption. The ability to recognize
group identities, and to favour one’s own group is widespread in humans and
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an innate tendency to favour in-groups seems to be universal for our species
(cf., LeVine, 1972).
Other studies have also demonstrated that limiting cooperation to a sub-
set of the population by genetically or culturally inherited tags may stabilise
cooperation (cf., Hammond & Axelrod, 2006; Ihara, 2011; Cohen, 2012).
However, various problems have been identified questioning the importance
of such tag-based cooperation. Recently various theoretical studies have
demonstrated that tag-based cooperation may be evolutionarily stable (Axel-
rod et al., 2004; Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). Our simulations confirm these
results, but the consequences of group discrimination strongly depend on
other parameters, most notably dispersal. We have systematically discussed
the roles of all model parameters in the Results.
Our model differs in several respects from that of a seemingly similar
model by Hammond & Axelrod (2006). First, in our simulations, the number
of group identities could evolve up to varying maxima, whereas in Hammond
and Axelrod’s model the maximum number of groups was four (recall that
we find a phase-transition-like increase of cooperation in the model with
more than four clans). Furthermore, in our model, cooperative and cheating
interactions can occur only between individuals of the same group; solitary
individuals of different groups had the same base fitness. This means that
cheaters cannot cheat individuals from a different group. In contrast, in the
HA model, the payoffs of cooperative and defecting strategies could vary
with the group identities of the players.
A different type of model has considered the ability to recognize cheating
as a stabilizing factor of cooperation (cf., Sibly & Curnow, 2012). Our study
does not assume recognition of a behaviour, but just of a group, irrespective
of the behaviour of its members. Group recognition probably requires less
cognitive abilities, and may thus be an easier (and probably also earlier) route
to the evolution of cooperation than recognition of behaviours.
It has been pointed out that group identities must be sufficiently stable
to prevent the emergence of cheaters (Cohen, 2012). This is true for more
sophisticated forms of cheating if group identities can be chosen, for example
based on a high frequency of cooperators in a group. In our simulations, this
was not the case, and a high mutation frequency of group identity disfavoured
cheaters rather than favouring them.
Varying the maximum number of groups (Figure 3B) revealed that a
smaller number than the numbers of groups we reach in many of our sim-
ulations is sufficient to maintain cheaters at a low frequency. Without an
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inherent fitness advantage of larger groups — i.e., a fitness component that
is independent of cooperation — the number of groups would increase and
average group size would decrease almost indefinitely (down to the size of
cooperating teams), because smaller groups of cooperators are hit by cheat-
ing mutants less often. However, the phase transition-like drop of cheater
frequency with increasing the number of possible groups shows that the fit-
ness advantage of further discrimination of groups has only a marginal fitness
advantage above a typically small number of groups (about 7 in the case of
Figure 3B).
If we assume additional marginal benefits of larger group size, i.e., ben-
efits that extend the benefit of local cooperation, we have two counteracting
selective pressures on group size: local interactions maintaining high group
diversity and thus small group size to avoid the risk of cheaters, and increased
group size to harvest the benefit thereof. These two counteracting selective
pressures could maintain a relatively small number of large groups, as seen
in many examples of human cooperation. Additional benefits seem plausible,
for example larger groups may have an advantage in occasional self-defence,
or have a higher genetic diversity, or share facilities above the level of the
local neighbourhood. Many forms of cooperation in human societies are
organised both locally and more globally. Systems theory has proven that
loosely coordinated assemblies of tightly coordinated (local) groups can be
extremely resistant to external perturbations (cf., connective stability: Sil-
jak, 1972) — a theoretical prediction that seems to be applicable to many of
our social structures. For example, religious groups are organised locally (in
parishes, congregation, or mosques) and organized in larger entities nation-
ally or internationally (dioceses, synods, movements). Provided that local
groups are sufficiently small, and isolated from other such groups, coopera-
tion may be stable, even though the many local groups of a particular kind
together are large.
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